Tag Archives: wisdom

On Replacing the Concept of Replacement

Michael Balls

Russell and Burch saw failure to accept the correlation
between humanity and efficacy as an example of rationalisation,
a psychological defence mechanism

While wondering what I could discuss in this column I looked, as I often do, in the abridged version1 of The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique,2 at Russell and Burch’s introduction of what I call the humanity criterion. It is part of their discussion of the sociological factors which are among the Factors Governing Progress. This is how part of page 101 of the abridged version reads:

In fact, really informative experiments must be as humane as would be conceivable possible, for science and exploration are indissolubly linked to the social activity of cooperation, which will find its expression in relation to other animals, no less than to our fellow humans. Conscious good will and the social operational method are useless as safeguards against the mechanism of rationalisation (in the pathological sense of the term – i.e. the mechanism of defence by which unacceptable thoughts or actions are given acceptable reasons to justify them to oneself and to others, while, at the same tie, unwittingly hiding the true, but unconscious, motives for them).

The bold type indicates my explanation, and I have to admit that, six years after preparing the abridged version of The Principles, I now found it difficult to see what Russell and Burch had intended to convey. I therefore looked back at the original book, and found this paragraph on pages 156−157:

In efficacy, or yield of information, the advantages of humane technique apply almost universally. The correlation between humanity and efficacy has appeared so often in this book that we need not labour the point. There is, however, a more fundamental aspect of this correlation, specially important in research. Science means the operational method — telling somebody else how to see what you saw. This method is one of the greatest of all human evolutionary innovations. It has, however, one drawback. It prevents permanent acceptance of false information, but it does not prevent wastage of time and effort. The activity of science is the supreme expression of the human exploratory drive, and as such it is the subject to the same pathology. The scientist is liable, like all other individuals, to block his exploration on some front where his reactions to childhood social experiences are impinged upon. When this happens to the experimental biologist, we can predict the consequence with certainty. Instead of really exploring, he will, in his experiments, act out on his animals, in a more or less symbolic and exaggerated way, some kind of treatment which he once experienced in social intercourse with his parents. He can rationalise this as exploration, and hence fail to notice the block. But in fact such acting out invariably occurs precisely when real exploration is blocked, and must be relinquished before real exploration can begin again. Hence, such experiments will be utterly wasteful, misleading, and uninformative. The treatment of the animals, for one thing, will inevitably be such as to impair their use as satisfactory models. The interpretation of the results will be vitiated by projection. Really informative experiments, must in fact be as humane as would be conceivably possible, for science and exploration are indissolubly linked to the social activity of cooperation, which will find its expression in relation to other animals no less than to our fellow humans. Conscious goodwill and the social operational method are useless as safeguards against the mechanism of rationalisation (in the pathological sense of the term).

Here, the underlining indicates what I omitted from the abridged version, and I now wonder why I did so. These words clearly reflect Russell’s interest in psychology — he later became a psychotherapist, and undoubtedly will have been influenced by discussions with his psychotherapist wife, Claire Russell. They could be seen as an explanation why some scientists did not appreciate the essential link between humanity and efficacy, and why Russell thought they needed what was offered by the Three Rs and the humanity criterion.

It is not clear what is meant by “the social operational method”, and consulting Google leads to only one hit — The Principles itself! “Conscious goodwill” is probably meant to contrast with unconscious rationalisation.  Perhaps what Russell meant is that, however sincere the intention may appear to be, support for the Three Rs is useless, unless it leads to active and practical commitment to their development and application.

We are often confronted with rationalisation, the pseudo-rational justification of irrational acts,3 and its relative, intellectualisation, a different defence mechanism (or way of making excuses), “where reasoning is used to block confrontation with an unconscious conflict and its associated emotional stress, where thinking is used to avoid feeling. It involves removing one’s self, emotionally, from a stressful event. Intellectualisation is one of Freud’s original defence mechanisms. Freud believed that memories have both conscious and unconscious aspects, and that intellectualisation allows for the conscious analysis of an event in a way that does not provoke anxiety.”4

I am not a psychoanalyst, and I think it would be unwise, even dangerous, were I to seek to delve into the underlying reasons why some scientists are so keen to run to animal experimentation as the first resort and to do so little to make possible its replacement. Nevertheless, I can say, without fear of contradiction, that this is another great example of how Russell and Burch’s wonderful book continues to give us food for thought and calls for action.

Professor Michael Balls
E-mail: michael.balls@btopenworld.com

1 Balls, M. (2009). The Three Rs and the Humanity Criterion, 131pp. Nottingham, UK:  FRAME.
2 Russell, W.M.S. & Burch, R.L. (1959). The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, xiv + 238pp. London, UK: Methuen.
3 Anon. (2015). Rationalization (psychology). San Francisco, CA, USA: Wikipedia Foundation, Inc. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationalization_(psychology) (Accessed 26.08.15).
4 Anon. (2015). Intellectualization. San Francisco, CA, USA: Wikipedia Foundation, Inc. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectualization (Accessed 26.08.15).

The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique is now out of print, but the full text can be found at http://altweb.jhsph.edu/pubs/books/humane_exp/het-toc. The abridged version, The Three Rs and the Humanity Criterion, can be obtained from

Download a pdf copy of this post by clicking here.

Previous Wisdom of Russell & Burch posts from Michael Balls:

The Concept, Sources and Incidence of Inhumanity and its Diminution or Removal Through Implementation of the Three Rs.
The Wages of Inhumanity.
Fidelity and Discrimination.
The Factors Governing Progress. 
UFAW and Major Charles Hume. 
The Toxicity Testing Problem. 
The Use of Lower Organisms.
The Analysis of Direct Inhumanity.
William Russell: Polymath, Wordsmith, Classicist and Humourist .
Rex Leonard Burch: Humane Scientist and Gentle Man.
On the Proper Application of Appropriate Statistical Methods. 
Comparative Substitution. 
The Three Rs: The Way Forward .
The Choice of Procedures .
Rationalisation and Intellectualisation.


Comparative Substitution

Michael Balls

The scientifically-justifiable choice of species is a crucial issue in animal
experimentation, which should not be based on ignorance and habit,
on slavish compliance with political expectations
and regulatory requirements



The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique1 was published a year after it was written, and Russell and Burch added an Addendum, because they felt that year had “seen much activity in several parts of the field”.

One point they made in the Addendum was that “the comparative substitution of lower for higher animals raises difficult issues”, but, “where great severity is concerned … we must be glad to see lower forms substituted for mammals”. Unfortunately, they said nothing more about the “difficult issues” to which they referred, and I wish I had asked them about it, while I had the chance to do so.

The discussion on comparative substitution in the chapter on Replacement in the main part of the book focuses on the use of non-sentient material (plants, micro-organisms), degenerate metazoan endoparasites and free-living metazoan invertebrates. They regarded such use as a “limited gain”, and considered that “to shed obsessional tears over the fate of these organisms would bring the whole concept of humanity into contempt”. They preferred to concentrate on “the wholly desirable progress and prospects of replacement proper”, i.e. the use of any scientific methods which “replace methods which use conscious living vertebrates”.

Russell and Burch considered that not enough was being done with lower vertebrates, and saw the predominant use of mammals as “yet another expression of the high-fidelity fallacy”.2 Here, Russell’s experiences as a zoology student at Oxford came to the fore, since “our ignorance of the behaviour of common laboratory mammals is offset by a wealth of knowledge about that of numerous lower vertebrate species”. He had worked on mating behaviour in Xenopus laevis, the South African clawed toad, alongside the Nobel-prizewinning work of Tinbergen and his colleagues on the behaviour of birds and fish. In a section on The Choice of Species, Russell and Burch argued that, in terms of humanity, the “subtle matching of procedure to species, and species to objectives, is more significant that it appears at first sight”. They said that “a formal or informal training in zoology has again and again proved its value in the progress of medical research”, and lamented attempts to “correct the mistaken choice of a wrong species by forcing it to conform to the requirements of the investigation”.

They marvelled at “the present large-scale choice of laboratory species”, but regretted that, “out of the almost astronomical number of vertebrate species, only a minute selection are employed … this includes about 20 mammal species, three bird species, about four reptile species, half a dozen or so amphibians, and half a dozen or so fish”. Of the mammalian species, they said, “only about half the species are used in numbers over 1,000 per annum, the overwhelming bulk being made up of the four chief species (mouse, rat, guinea-pig and rabbit), and, of these, more than two-thirds are mice”.

Lack of sufficient understanding of the animals used for experimental purposes is still rife today. For example, the customary feeding ad libitum of caged rats and mice fundamentally alters their endocrinological, neurological and behavioural status. In real life, they spend most of their time searching for food, not eating it, while keeping alert because of the threat of predators. Also, the feminisation of male fish and amphibians by so-called endocrine disruptors, was taken as a warning of threats to human masculinity, whereas it is a normal part of the adaptability of these lower vertebrates. Even worse are attempts to genetically humanise laboratory animals, in order to make them better models for humans, without sufficient understanding of the cascade of complications likely to result from the consequent distortions of the very nature of the animals concerned.

Russell and Burch said rather little about choosing between the higher mammals, except to say that they were pleased to note that the Indian Government had “imposed salutary regulations” on the shipment of monkeys to provide kidney cells for vaccine production, and that the Medical Research Council had “issued recommendations on humane shipment”, which had been “adopted by all the British airlines concerned with livestock transport”. They welcomed “such action being taken on behalf of animals, which, although our near relatives, receive none of the privileges accorded by the Home Office to cats, dogs and the equidae” (the commonest animals to be encountered in Victorian England, when the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 became law).
Over the years, I have had many discussions with veterinarians about whether there should be a hierarchy of laboratory mammals in the terms of the need to justify their use, with rats and mice near the bottom, and dogs and non-human primates at the top, or whether all the species should be afforded the same standards of consideration and care. I take the former view, and that is the position laid down in the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, as amended to comply with Directive 2010/63/EU.

But what about the substitution of one species high in the hierarchy with another species high in the hierarchy. This point arose when somebody occupying a high position in the Three Rs movement, commenting on our study on the use of tests in dogs for predicting human toxicology and drug safety,3 warned us that “dropping the dog on the basis of your existing evidence could result in an increase in the use of nonhuman primates”. That would present advocates of the routine use of a second, ‘high-fidelity’, nonrodent species in toxicity testing with a dilemma and a challenge. How could they justify replacing pointless tests in one highly-protected species with pointless tests in another highly-protected species?

Professor Michael Balls
Russell & Burch House
96–98 North Sherwood Street
Nottingham NG1 4EE
E-mail: michael.balls@btopenworld.com

1 Russell, W.M.S. & Burch, R.L. (1959). The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, xiv + 238pp. London,
UK: Methuen.
2 Balls, M. (2013). The wisdom of Russell and Burch. 3. Fidelity and discrimination. ATLA 41, P42–P43.
3 Bailey, J., Thew, M. & Balls, M. (2013). An analysis on the use of dogs in predicting human toxicology and drug safety. ATLA 41, 335–330.
The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique is now out of print, but the full text can be found at http://altweb.jhsph.edu/pubs/books/humane_exp/het-toc. An abridged version, The Three Rs and the Humanity Criterion, can be obtained from FRAME.

Download a pdf of this article. Comparative Substitution